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Abstract
Local critics of surveillance abuses may come under increased surveillance themselves. Exposing
surveillance is crucial to challenging it. Those who oppose surveillance are said to be defending criminals,
terrorists, and pedophiles. A really effective agency, one that gets in the way of poLocal critics of
surveillance abuses may come under increased surveillance themselves. Exposing surveillance is crucial
to challenging it. Those who oppose surveillance are said to be defending criminals, terrorists, and
pedophiles. A really effective agency, one that gets in the way of powerful interests, is likely to have its
funding cut. If the rich and powerful want surveillance, then make sure the searchlight is turned on them
as well as others. Over the years, many people have opposed surveillance, seeing it as an invasion of
privacy or a tool of social control. Dedicated campaigners and concerned citizens have opposed bugging
of phones, identity cards, security cameras, database linking, and many other types of surveillance. They
have lobbied and campaigned against abuses and for legal or procedural restrictions. Others have
developed ways of getting around surveillance.

Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law

Publication Details
Martin, B. (2010). Opposing surveillance. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 29 (2), 26-32.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/76

Opposing
pp
g
Surveillance

© ISTOCK

BRIAN MARTIN

O
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/MTS.2010.937025

26

|

ver the years, many people have opposed surveillance,
seeing it as an invasion of privacy or a tool of social
control. Dedicated campaigners and concerned citizens
have opposed bugging of phones, identity cards, security
cameras, database linking, and many other types of surveillance. They have lobbied and campaigned against abuses and for
legal or procedural restrictions. Others have developed ways of getting
around surveillance.
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In parallel with resistance, there
have been excellent critiques of
surveillance, exposing its harmful
impacts and its role in authoritarian control (e.g., [2], [6], [8], [12],
[13], [16], [21], [25]).
However, comparatively little
is written about tactics and strategy against surveillance. Indeed,
social scientists have little to say
about tactics and strategy in any
ﬁeld [9, pp. xii-xiii]. My aim here
is to present a framework for understanding tactics used in struggles over surveillance.
Actions that are seen to be unfair or to violate social norms can
generate outrage among observers
[20]. Nonviolence researcher Gene
Sharp [28, pp. 657–703] found
that violent attacks on peaceful
protesters – something that many
people see as unjust – could be
counterproductive for the attackers, generating greater support for
the protesters among the protesters’
supporters, third parties, and even
the attacking group. Because of
this potential for attacks to be counterproductive, attackers, by design
or intuition, may take steps to reduce possible outrage. By examining
a wide range of issues – censorship,
unfair dismissal, violent attacks on
peaceful protesters, torture, and aggressive war – a predictable pattern
in tactics can be discerned: perpetrators regularly use ﬁve sorts of
methods to minimize adverse reactions to their actions [15]:
1) Cover-up: the action is hidden
or disguised.
2) Devaluation: the target of the
action is denigrated.
3) Reinterpretation:
plausible
explanations are given for the
action.
4) Ofﬁcial channels: experts, formal investigations, or courts
are used to give an appearance
of justice.
5) Intimidation and bribery: targets and their allies are threatened or attacked, or given
incentives to cooperate.

Local critics of surveillance abuses
may come under increased
surveillance themselves.
This is called the backﬁre model: when these methods are insufﬁcient to dampen public outrage, the
action can backﬁre on the perpetrator. However, backﬁre is rare: in
most cases, the methods work sufﬁciently well to minimize outrage.
Consider an example different
from surveillance: police use force
in arresting someone. This has the
potential to cause public outrage if
the force used is seen as unnecessary, excessive, or vindictive. Police in these circumstances regularly use one or more of the ﬁve
methods. If possible, they undertake the arrest out of the public eye.
They refer to the person arrested as
a criminal or by derogatory terms.
If challenged, they claim arrestees
were resisting and that using force
was necessary and carried out according to protocol. They refer those
with grievances to ofﬁcial complaints procedures, which almost
always rule in favor of the police.
And they may threaten the arrestee
with criminal charges should they
make a complaint [22].
On March 3, 1991, Los Angeles
police arrested a man named Rodney King, in the course of which
King was hit by two 50 000-V
tasers and beaten with metal batons more than 50 times. This arrest would have gone unnoticed
except that George Holliday, who
lived nearby, recorded the beating
on his new video camera. When
footage was shown on television,
it caused a massive public and
political reaction against the Los
Angeles police. Holliday’s videotape cut through the normal
cover-up and allowed viewers to
judge the events for themselves,
overriding the police’s interpretation of the events and the media’s
normal police-sympathetic framing [11]. Nevertheless, in the en-
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suing saga, the police and their
supporters used every one of the
ﬁve methods of inhibiting outrage – though, unusually, in this
case their efforts were unsuccessful in preventing a huge backlash
against the police [14].
Tactics for and against surveillance can be analyzed using the
same framework. The foundation
for public outrage is a sense of unfairness. This is certainly present
at least some of the time: people
may see surveillance as an invasion of privacy (as with hidden
video cameras), as a tool of repression (as in monitoring dissenters),
or a tool of exploitation (as in monitoring of workers). The very word
“surveillance” is a tool in opposing
it, because the word has such negative connotations.
A sense of unfairness is not
inherent in the act of observing
someone or collecting and analyzing data about them. People’s
sense of unfairness is the subject of
a continual struggle, with privacy
campaigners trying to increase
concern and purveyors of surveillance techniques trying to reduce
it. Methods to inhibit or amplify
outrage are used within the prevailing set of attitudes and in turn
affect those attitudes.
Given that some people see surveillance as inappropriate, unfair,
dangerous, or damaging, there is a
potential for resistance and hence
it is predictable that one or more
of the ﬁve methods of inhibiting
outrage will be deployed. In the
remainder of this article, I look at
each of the ﬁve methods of inhibiting outrage and ways to challenge
these methods.
The ﬁve-method classiﬁcation
used here is a convenient framework
for examining tactics for and against
surveillance. To use this framework
|
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Exposing surveillance
is crucial to challenging it.
does not require actors to be consciously engaging in a struggle,
as many are simply reacting to the
circumstances in which they ﬁnd
themselves. For those who are concerned about surveillance, though,
it is useful to think in terms of tactics and strategies.

Cover-Up and Exposure
Surveillance is commonly carried
out in secret. When people don’t
realize it’s happening, they are far
less likely to become concerned
about it. The secrecy covering
surveillance is part of a wider pattern of government and corporate
secrecy [24].
Political surveillance of individuals is normally done surreptitiously. Bugs are installed in
residences; telephones are tapped;
remote cameras record movement;
police in plain clothes observe at a
discrete distance. There is an obvious reason for this: targets, if they
know about surveillance, are better
able to avoid or resist it. But secrecy
is maintained beyond operational
necessities: in most cases, the existence of surveillance is kept secret
long afterwards, often never to be
revealed. Exposures may require
exceptional circumstances [16],
such as the collapse of East Germany’s communist regime or the
“liberation” of FBI ﬁles at Media,
Pennsylvania, in 1971 by the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate
the FBI [1]. When surveillance is
exposed, for example FBI surveillance of individuals such as Martin
Luther King, Jr. and John Lennon,
it can cause outrage. The revelation
that the National Security Agency
had been spying on U.S. citizens
since 2002 caused a massive adverse reaction.
Employers sometimes do not
want to tell workers they are being
monitored when there is a possibil28
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ity this may stimulate individual or
collective resistance. (On other occasions employers are open about
monitoring, when this serves to induce compliance.)
Under the U.S. Patriot Act, the
FBI can obtain secret warrants to
obtain records from libraries, Internet service providers, and other
organizations. The organizations
subject to this intrusion cannot reveal it, under severe penalties. This
draconian enforcement of secrecy
serves to reduce personal and popular concern about surveillance,
for example when the Patriot Act
is used against non-terrorist groups
such as antiwar protesters.
In some cases, surveillance
becomes routinized, so cover-up
is less important. In many areas,
camera monitoring is carried out
openly: it is possible to observe
oneself, on a screen, walking into
a shop. On the other hand, some
forms of surveillance are hidden so
effectively that they are completely
outside of most people’s awareness,
for example collection of web data,
meshing of database ﬁles, police
checks on car licence numbers and
recording of bank transactions.
The importance of low visibility
in enabling surveillance to continue and expand is apparent through
a thought experiment: imagine that
you received, at the end of every
month, a list of instances in which
data had been collected about you,
by whom and for what purpose.
Imagine knowing whether you had
been placed on a list to be denied a
loan or a job.
Exposing surveillance is crucial
to challenging it. Exposure requires
collection of information, putting it
into a coherent, persuasive form,
providing credible backing for the
evidence, and communicating to
a receptive audience. Sometimes
a single person can do all of these

steps, collecting information directly and publishing it on the web.
Normally, though, a chain of participants is involved, for example
an insider who leaks documents, a
researcher who prepares an analysis, a journalist who writes a story
and an editor or producer who
publishes it. Campaigners help in
exposure, as with Privacy International’s Big Brother Awards for
organizations with bad records in
threatening privacy.

Devaluation and Validation
If a person is perceived as unworthy, then people don’t get as upset
when bad things are done to them.
Executing an innocent person is
seen as outrageous; executing a serial murderer elicits less concern.
The inmates of the U.S. prison at
Guantánamo were portrayed as the
“worst of the worst”; abrogating
the civil rights of people painted as
terrorists was accepted by much of
the population, at least initially.
It is to be expected, therefore,
that proponents of surveillance
will denigrate targets as a means to
justify their operations. Three popular labels for targets of surveillance are criminals, terrorists, and
pedophiles. Who could be opposed
to ﬁngerprinting welfare recipients
if it prevents cheating? Who could
be opposed to monitoring of emails
or cameras on every street corner
if it helps deter pedophiles? Furthermore, devaluation is extended
to those who oppose surveillance,
who are said to be defending criminals, terrorists, and pedophiles.
The trite expression “If you have
nothing to hide, you have nothing
to fear” is built on an implicit devaluation: if you’re concerned about
privacy and surveillance, you must
have something to hide, which implies you’re guilty and devious [19].
Therefore, any surveillance seems
to be justiﬁed.
One way to challenge devaluation is to emphasise the essential
humanity of every individual. A
powerful way to do this is to make
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targets human, by using names,
photos, and personal details. Australian David Hicks was incarcerated without trial at Guantánamo
for over ﬁve years, and stigmatized
by the Australian government as
a terrorist. Opponents of Hicks’
treatment were eventually able to
generate concern, using photos of
Hicks to make him appear as an ordinary person. Hicks’ father Terry
spoke out on his behalf, as did his
U.S. military lawyer Michael Mori:
having valued allies helps counter
devaluation.
The same principle applies to
validating targets of surveillance.
Personal stories of individuals
subject to political surveillance
are potent tools for validation. For
example, Penn Kimball [10] in his
book The File poignantly tells of
discovering spy agency ﬁles about
himself in 1978, three decades after they were initiated on a ﬂimsy
pretext. The 2006 German ﬁlm
The Lives of Others encouraged the
viewer to identify with the targets
of East German political surveillance and with the Stasi agent who
came to sympathize with them.
Personal stories of innocent victims of surveillance gone wrong
are similarly powerful. A few people will respond to abstract arguments about human rights; many
more will respond to personal stories. George Orwell’s novel 1984,
a powerful portrait of a dystopian
future, uses the personal story of
Winston Smith to make larger political points.

Interpretation Struggles
Proponents of measures that increase surveillance typically provide a justiﬁcation, often in terms
that resonate with widely accepted
values. Identiﬁcation of vehicles is
to monitor trafﬁc, detect lawbreakers, or collect congestion fees;
compilation of corporate databases
is to increase efﬁciency and provide better customer service; cameras are to prevent crime; identity
cards are to reduce fraud; baggage

Those who oppose surveillance
are said to be defending criminals,
terrorists, and pedophiles.
checks are to prevent terrorism.
The most effective justiﬁcations
have an element of truth, sometimes quite a large element. The
increase in surveillance is simply
a by-product, deemed insigniﬁcant
and unproblematic.
Proponents typically exaggerate the effectiveness of measures.
One powerful way to do this is to
treat effectiveness as self-evident.
Cameras on public streets deter
crime, of course. Who could doubt
it? Seldom is empirical evidence
provided; perhaps little is collected or sought. This is an especially
potent technique because it doesn’t
require the public to trust what authorities say, because members of
the public are the ones drawing the
conclusion. Airline travelers who,
in order to ﬂy, tolerate pointless
checks through bags and removal
of ﬁngernail ﬁles and nail clippers
may not question the assumption
that such measures are deterring
terrorists.
Proponents seldom discuss alternative ways of accomplishing
the same goal. An alternative approach to aircraft hijackings is to
train passengers in how to communicate with each other and organize to overcome terrorists, as
occurred spontaneously on 9/11
United Airlines ﬂight 93 [26]. This
approach involves trusting passengers and increasing their awareness
and skills rather than treating them
as potential terrorists. It is seldom
mentioned by government authorities, who focus exclusively on measures that give agencies greater
power. Radical alternatives are seldom articulated. Rather than keep
extensive records on poor people to
prevent them cheating on welfare,
an alternative is to increase the level of free distribution. For example,
free or low-cost food could be pro-
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vided to anyone who wants it, an
expansion of current welfare services. This would reduce the need
to monitor individuals.
Problems with surveillance systems are typically said to be rare
or non-existent. Sometimes, though,
surveillance abuses are publicized,
for example cases in which someone has been denied a loan due to
incorrect information on a database. These are explained away as
rare mistakes. Then there are the
systemic abuses, such as the illegal selling of information from
databases – for example those held
by police – to private investigators
and others. These are commonly
attributed to rogue operators. The
system of information collection is
not blamed.
In summary, proponents of surveillance typically provide a plausible
justiﬁcation for measures, exaggerate or simply assume their effectiveness, ignore alternatives and explain
away abuses as rare events due to
rogue elements.
Opponents of surveillance have
challenged every one of these interpretative techniques. Most importantly, they have highlighted the
potential of existing or potential
systems to increase unnecessary
and damaging surveillance. They
have challenged claims or assumptions about effectiveness. They have
proposed alternatives. And they
have argued that abuses are symptoms of ﬂawed systems.
One of the key elements of
interpretation struggles is the language used. Proponents of intrusive measures almost never use the
word “surveillance.” For example,
cameras are called security cameras, not surveillance cameras. What
about opponents? It is common
to use the language of “privacy,”
which resonates with people’s
|
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A really effective agency, one
that gets in the way of powerful
interests, is likely to have its
funding cut.
concerns about the sanctity of private life. But privacy rhetoric has
disadvantages, in particular that it
is personal in focus, whereas surveillance is largely an institutional
practice [29].
John Gilliom [7] analyzed the
arguments used for and against
compulsory drug testing in U.S.
workplaces in the 1980s. Proponents justiﬁed testing mainly in
terms of safety at work, the drug
problem generally, and the productivity of drug users, whereas
opponents mainly cited privacy followed by legal rights, testing error,
and other concerns, of which surveillance was mentioned by only a
few. Gilliom argues that rights discourse was limited because the law
is constructed to serve the powerful, and improvements in drug test
methods addressed concerns about
errors while allowing the testing to
continue. The implication of Gilliom’s analysis is that opponents’
choices of arguments against testing can have a major inﬂuence on
the success of opposition generally,
because arguments lead to particular ways of challenging testing –
including legal methods, a form of
ofﬁcial channel.

Official Channels
Courts, ombudsmen, grievance
procedures, and formal inquiries
are examples of ofﬁcial channels.
Many people believe that these
provide justice. They do in quite a
few cases, but when the perpetrator
is far more powerful than the victim, ofﬁcial channels typically give
only an illusion of justice. For example, some people who speak out
in the public interest are nominally
protected by whistleblower laws,
but in practice these laws provide
30
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little or no protection [5]. Ofﬁcial channels are typically slow,
focused on procedural technicalities, dependent on experts (such as
lawyers) and keep matters out of
the public eye. They are the exact
opposite of using publicity to mobilize public concern. Regulatory
agencies for protecting privacy ﬁt
this mold.
Some opponents of drug testing
in U.S. workplaces took cases to
courts, some of which opposed testing. However, the Supreme Court
supported testing, so the legal approach failed overall (Gilliom [7]).
Along the way, it soaked up a large
amount of money and effort, took
a long time, distracted energy away
from other opposition options, and
enabled proponents to achieve an
authoritative legal opinion in favor
of testing.
In Australia, the Privacy Commissioner, a government-funded
ofﬁce, can receive complaints and
make judgements. But its role is
severely constrained. The Commissioner has to operate within
the current law, which for example
does not cover private sector uses
of information. As soon as the law
is changed, for example to allow
another type of database matching, the Commissioner must accept this as the new framework for
judging privacy concerns. Furthermore, the Commissioner cannot do
much to oppose any practices that
it judges to be violations. Anyone
who looks to the Privacy Commissioner for relief from actual
invasions of privacy, or to halt a
new practice, is likely to be disappointed [3].
In most countries, government
agencies charged with protecting
privacy have been ceding ground

for decades. There are some legislative and administrative constraints on surveillance, to be sure,
but agencies provide little for anyone seeking redress. If you know
or suspect that your employer has
been monitoring your email, that
your telephone company has been
releasing logs about your calls, or
that information about your purchases is on a corporate database,
you can approach any number of
agencies, most likely to ﬁnd out
that either the practice is legal,
that you have no right to know, or
that no information is available
to you.
There are many people working in or with agencies who are
dedicated to the public interest.
The problem is not motivation but
the role of agencies in the social
structure: they are given limited
mandates and inadequate funding,
must operate according to bureaucratic regulations and have little or
no capacity to initiate signiﬁcant
change. They can be simply overwhelmed by contrary forces, such
as the post-9/11 war on terror. Finally, a really effective agency, one
that gets in the way of powerful interests, is likely to have its funding
cut or its mandate restricted.
The implication is that opponents of surveillance should not
look to ofﬁcial channels as the
solution. Stronger laws and wellfunded oversight bodies can be
worthwhile, but it is a mistake to
put too much energy into promoting them, especially because reforms can so easily be rolled back
[23]. Increasing public concern
should be the primary goal, and
that means publicizing the issues,
gaining supporters, building alliances, and developing campaigns.
If these efforts are effective, it is
likely that governments will create
or bolster ofﬁcial bodies to try to
convince people that the problem is
well in hand.
In 2005, the British government introduced the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, which
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includes a provision requiring protesters within one kilometer of
Parliament Square to obtain a permit, a requirement that allows ﬁles
on radicals to be compiled. To
even wear a T-shirt with a slogan
requires a permit. Activist comedian Mark Thomas [30] promoted
“Mass Lone Demos” by thousands
of people with diverse causes, for
example some opposing the Iraq
war and others whimsically opposing the month of February,
overloading the police with permit requests and making fun of
the law.

Intimidation, Bribery,
and Resistance
Surveillance measures can be intimidating: no one likes to imagine that their conversations and
actions are being recorded. Having
one’s photo and ﬁngerprints taken
by a government body can be humiliating and stigmatizing. Intimidation serves to reduce expressions
of resistance. Local critics of surveillance abuses are likely to come
under increased surveillance themselves, rather like the way peace
activists can end up on U.S. government no-ﬂy lists. (Prominent
critics may be a bit safer, because
surveillance of them, if discovered and disclosed, could generate
more publicity).
There is also a parallel process
of encouragement to go along with
intrusive measures. If you supply
your identiﬁcation card, you have
access to government services. If
you allow cookies, you have access to certain websites. If you
allow your license number to be
recorded, you can drive on certain
roads. Surveillance often comes
along with beneﬁts. Accepting the
beneﬁts creates a psychological
debt: a greater willingness to accept surveillance.
To oppose surveillance, there
need to be some people willing to
resist. Insiders, with knowledge
of abuses, can leak information to
public critics. Investigative jour-

If the rich and powerful want
surveillance, then make sure the
searchlight is turned on them as
well as others.
nalists can probe political surveillance. Citizens can expose what
has happened to them. This is resistance aimed at mobilizing wider
awareness of surveillance and its
damaging effects.
Many individuals attempt to
avoid or disrupt surveillance, for
example by giving incorrect information on forms, joining campaigns against identity cards, or
damaging speed cameras. If actions are widely taken up, they can
have a major impact and can stimulate development of new methods
of resistance. Using and promoting
encryption is an example. If everyone puts some encrypted ﬁles on
their computer and sends occasional encrypted emails, even if they
have nothing to hide, this makes
it harder for snoops to determine
who is worth watching. This is
especially important in repressive
regimes, where use of encryption
might be seen as implying subversive activities. Struggles to enable
access to encryption technology
are a vital part of resistance [27].
Gary Marx [18] has distinguished 11 different types of individual resistance to surveillance,
for example avoiding detection,
blocking intrusive measures, refusing to provide information, and
encouraging surveillance agents
not to enforce regulations. He gives
examples of each type of resistance
and argues that there will be an ongoing struggle between controllers
and resisters, with total control being unrealizable.
Methods of intimidation are often linked to cover-up. Beginning
in the 1970s, CovertAction Information Bulletin challenged secret
agencies by exposing the identities
of undercover CIA agents; in re-
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sponse, the U.S. Congress in 1982
passed a law against this. This law
later led to a giant scandal when
government officials revealed
the identity of CIA agent Valerie
Plame in reprisal against her husband Joseph Wilson for questioning false claims used to justify the
2003 invasion of Iraq [31].
This case suggests that datagathering can sometimes be turned
against powerful groups. Normally, the groups that instigate and
run surveillance systems, such as
politicians, employers, top bureaucrats, and spy agencies, are not
equally subject to the techniques
they use against others. For example, employers may monitor workers but workers are seldom able
to monitor employers to the same
extent. Collecting data about the
rich and powerful, putting them
on a par with others, challenges
and deters intimidation. In other
words, if the rich and powerful
want surveillance, then make sure
the searchlight is turned on them
as well as others.

Challenging Surveillance
In order to gain insight into struggles over surveillance, it is useful
to analyze the methods typically
used by perpetrators of perceived
injustice to reduce outrage over
their actions. The promoters of surveillance commonly hide their operations, denigrate the targets and
critics of surveillance, give plausible justiﬁcations for operations,
set up oversight bodies that have
little power to challenge anything
more than minor violations of regulations, intimidate opponents, and
provide incentives for cooperation.
To refer to “promoters of surveillance” and describe their methods
|
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does not imply any conscious intent
on their part: many of them do not
see themselves as promoting surveillance, but rather as cracking
down on crime, providing better
consumer service, or increasing the
efﬁciency of service systems; they
believe in their own interpretations
of what is happening. Likewise, to
speak about the methods used to
reduce outrage need not imply any
conscious strategy; these methods
are simply intuitive or obvious
ways to reduce opposition.
The value of looking at methods used by promoters of surveillance is that it gives guidance for
opponents. Some of these are fairly
obvious, including exposing abuses
and explaining what is wrong with
surveillance. Others are less so, in
particular being sceptical of ofﬁcial
channels and instead mobilizing
support. Over the decades, many
critics of surveillance have advocated stronger regulations, yet these
have been regularly superseded by
new technologies, overturned by
emergency powers, undermined
by loopholes and made hollow
by weak enforcement. According
to the model used here – reﬂecting studies of a wide range of domains – relying on regulations is
seriously ﬂawed: to a considerable
extent, it gives only the appearance
of dealing with problems, dampening public concern while allowing
developments to continue.
To challenge surveillance, according to the framework used here,
public outrage needs to be fostered
in a range of ways. The model gives
guidance for actions that are likely
to be effective, but it does not say
who will or should take action.
Dedicated opponents have too often been overwhelmed by the forces promoting surveillance. In such
circumstances, even the best tactics
may be inadequate.
Nevertheless, it is far too soon
to lose heart. Many other social
movements – against slavery, for

32
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women’s emancipation, against
environmental destruction – only
gained widespread support after
decades or centuries of exploitation and damage. Surveillance may
become more ubiquitous and insidious, but there remains a strong
reservoir of public concern about
privacy, autonomy, and freedom.
Today’s critics and campaigners are
laying the basis for a future challenge to emerge. Understanding tactics can help make that challenge
more effective.
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